“The Napoleon of the Moskowa, who, to make use of a vulgar expression, takes the bull by the horns; this was the reason why this battle was so bloody and so hotly fought, etc.” How much justification there is for this remark appears from Clausewitz’s review of Napoleon’s tactics, which we have cited above. But Davout had a case to make out, apparently, and he desired to score a point at every stage of his criticism; an extremely common temptation, by the way, to which very many critics yield. As for the losses suffered by the French to which Davout refers, it must be remembered that Napoleon would have brought the action to a close two hours sooner, had it not been for the unexpected apparition of d’Erlon’s Corps; and that a good part of the French loss was suffered in those two hours. The same cause also operated to render the victory much less decisive than it otherwise would have been, as darkness came on before anything like pursuit could be attempted. Any fair criticism, therefore, of Napoleon’s conduct of the battle of Ligny ought to proceed on the supposition that this unlucky incident, for which a superserviceable staff-officer was solely responsible, had not occurred. On this supposition, then, the Prussian centre at Ligny would have been broken between 6 and 7 P.M., the losses of the French would have been much less, and their victory would necessarily have been much more complete. 8. The wisdom of Napoleon’s course in arresting the attack on the Prussian centre when the news of the appearance of a strange corps which might possibly consist of hostile troops was brought to him, has perhaps not received the attention it deserves. When Napoleon decided to wait till he should learn what this body of troops might be, he was all ready to give the finishing blow to the Prussian army. He was pretty certain to break up a large part of that army. If the unknown corps should turn out to have come from Ney, it was certainly in a position where it could play a most important part in the attack. If, on the other hand, it should turn out to have come from Wellington, Napoleon, provided only that he should have time enough to complete his contemplated stroke against Blücher, would probably be in a much better situation to deal with his antagonists than he could otherwise hope to occupy. It would seem, therefore, as if it was by no means clear that Napoleon took the wisest course when he deferred the main attack on the Prussians on the appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps.