If, now, we ask what would probably have happened if Ney had collected his troops at Frasnes during the forenoon, in order that he might be able promptly to obey his orders as soon as they should be received, as we have above maintained he ought to have done, we are inclined to think that the simultaneous movement upon Quatre Bras between twelve and two o’clock of 40,000 men would have brought about the prompt retirement by the Prince of Orange[421] of Perponcher’s division. It would probably have fallen back on Nivelles, where Chassé was assembling the other Dutch-Belgian division. Whether the Duke on his return from Brye could have effected a concerted attack on the French by combining a movement on the Brussels road by Picton and the Brunswickers with one on the Nivelles road by Perponcher and Alten, it is not easy to say. The advantage of position would have clearly been with the French, and in fact they would have been considerably superior in numbers. There would certainly have existed no reason why in this case Ney could not have sent 10,000 or even 20,000 men down the Namur road in compliance with the orders of 2 and 3.15 P.M.[422] Neither of the above-described advantages was gained by Marshal Ney. By leaving the divisions of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies instead of bringing them up to Frasnes early in the morning,—by leaving that of Durutte at Jumet, and the other three of d’Erlon’s divisions still further in rear until long after the last regiments of the 2d Corps had left Gosselies,—he rendered a prompt and bloodless occupation of Quatre Bras almost impossible. Exactly how far he was responsible for the gap between his two corps, we do not know. But we can certainly say that a diligent and experienced officer in Ney’s place would have known to a half an hour just how long after the arrival of the last division of the 2d Corps, the van of the 1st Corps might be expected. The whole management of Marshal Ney on this day shows distrust of the Emperor’s judgment, unwillingness to take the most obvious steps, finally, disobedience of orders. As the natural consequence of his wilfulness and perverseness he failed to reap the enormous successes which the Emperor’s sagacity had placed within his power. All he did was to prevent Wellington from giving any aid to Blücher. This he certainly accomplished; and an important service it was. He also showed himself as he always did, a brave, resolute, capable officer on the field of battle. Probably he did as much as any one could have done with the force actually under his hand. But had he taken the necessary steps to get the large and powerful body of troops which Napoleon had entrusted to his care well in hand in due season, he could not have failed, so far as we can see, to achieve a striking success, which might very possibly have had a decisive effect on the fortunes of the war. If each of the two allied generals had been defeated at the outset of the