campaign, the chances of Napoleon for final victory would have been greatly in his favor. In regard to the conduct of this battle by the Duke of Wellington nothing new can be said. He has always received the credit which he certainly fully merited, of maintaining most skilfully and with great spirit and tenacity a fight in which he was outmatched until nearly the close of the day. He had been gravely misled by his chief-of-staff as to the situation of the various bodies which composed his army; and in fact it must be admitted that his own calculations were very far from being worthy of his reputation. Hence he ran the risk of encountering a largely superior force; and that he had actually to deal with only half of this force was due to no strategy of his. He found himself in a most perplexing and dangerous situation, in which he displayed undoubtedly great skill and courage, but for the successful result of the day he was largely indebted to the “fortune of war.”[423] FOOTNOTES: [396] _Cf._ Jomini, p. 221. [397] Jomini, p. 226, defends Reille’s course. We shall discuss this question in the Notes to this chapter. [398] _Cf._ Jomini, pp. 221, 226. [399] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92, 145; Muquardt, pp. 145, 146, 149, n. Charras, though discussing Ney’s conduct at considerable length (vol. 2, pp. 236 _et seq._), does not touch upon this part of it. [400] Kellermann, Charras says, vol. 1, p. 188, had at 10.30 A.M. passed Gosselies. His two divisions were, therefore, long before 2 P.M., at Frasnes, and Liberchies. [401] “_Vers 3 heures._” Reille’s statement, Doc. Inéd, p. 59. [402] Or that of Guilleminot, as Charras prefers to call it. Charras, vol. 1, pp. 195, 196, n. [403] Gomm, p. 353; Waterloo Letters, p. 23. [404] Siborne, vol. 1, p 108. [405] We shall not attempt a tactical account of the battle. It is well described by Siborne and Charras, and there is much of value in other writers. But it is not worth while at this late day to go into detail. [406] Doc. Inéd., p. 71, Durutte’s statement. [407] Drouet, p. 95. [408] Ib., p. 95; Doc. Inéd, p. 65; d’Erlon’s statement. [409] As it would seem from the map. But the distance is a matter of conjecture only. [410] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 207. [411] But see “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 132 _et seq._ [412] So, Hooper, pp. 136, 137. [413] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381. [414] Charras, vol. 1, p. 206. [415] Ib., p. 204, n. [416] Ib., p. 206. [417] Ib., p. 206. Charras says that Roussel’s division remained where it was. He is probably correct. But see Siborne, vol. 1, p. 136, and Hooper, p. 127. [418] Siborne is in error in supposing that there were two charges. Only one brigade was put in, the cuirassiers, and this was towards the end of the action. [419] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 153. Charras, vol. 1, p. 210, rates Wellington’s force as high as 37,000 men.