And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington 212, 213 Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras 214 At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the pursuit of the English 214 His remark to d’Erlon 215 Interesting picture of the march by the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo” 215 Skirmish at Genappe 216 The English take up positions south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean 216 NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 217 1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz’s opinion 217 2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre 218 3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—_e. g._, on Clausewitz 218 4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light 219 On Chesney 219 On Maurice 219 On Hamley 221 On Hooper 222 5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently explicit. Charras’ opinion 222 6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gembloux considered 223 7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur 223 8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities, when so much was at stake 224, 225 CHAPTER XIV: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON 226 Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre 226 Renunciation of the line of Namur 226 But a general concentration at Wavre not necessarily implied 226 Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau’s action 227 Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of union with the English 228 Although he recognized the difficulties attending it 228 And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington 229