[420] Even Hooper admits (p. 137) that the “timely presence” of these troops would have “placed Wellington in an extremity of peril.” _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 162, 163. [421] The Duke of Wellington did not get back from Brye, where he had gone to confer with Marshal Blücher, until half-past two o’clock. [422] Jomini, however, says (p. 227) that all that could have been expected of Ney even in this case would have been to maintain his position. But he says this in a letter to Marshal Ney’s son, and his statement cannot be taken seriously. The events of the day demonstrated that one corps would have been amply sufficient to hold the place, had it been once occupied by the French. [423] _Cf._ Chesney, p. 137. _NOTES TO CHAPTER XII._ 1. Charras’ references to the orders to Marshal Ney as respects Kellermann’s cavalry, are disingenuous and very misleading. They are evidently intended to throw the blame for the non-employment of this body of troops upon the shoulders of Napoleon. It will be remembered that in his letter[424] to Ney, which the Emperor said might arrive a little before the formal order signed by Marshal Soult, the Emperor told Ney what his wishes were as to the disposition of his troops after he should have occupied Quatre Bras. One division was to be stationed two leagues in front of Quatre Bras,—six divisions around Quatre Bras,—and Kellermann’s cavalry at the intersection of the Roman road with the Charleroi turnpike, so that the Emperor might recall it, if he desired so to do. In the same letter he tells Ney to be careful of Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ division, which belonged to the Guard. It seems plain enough that this letter must be taken in connection with Soult’s definite order,[425] to which the letter refers, which ordered Ney to direct the 1st and 2d _corps d’armée_ and the 3d corps of cavalry,—Kellermann’s,—upon Quatre Bras, and there take up his position. But the latest order[426] of Soult positively instructs Ney to unite the two corps of Counts Reille and d’Erlon and also that of the Count of Valmy, and says in so many words that with these forces he ought to be able “to beat and destroy” the enemy. There is not either in the letter or in these orders a single word limiting the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry to “a case of necessity.” Yet this is what Charras states[427] was contained in Soult’s order. He even says that Ney did not dare[428] to employ but one out of the four brigades of which Kellermann’s Corps consisted,—meaning that he was so hampered by his orders. Hooper[429] also says that Ney used Kellermann’s cavalry “sparingly, in obedience to the instructions of Napoleon.” The orders speak for themselves. Ney was not only permitted to use Kellermann’s Corps, but was positively directed to do so. It was only in his use of the cavalry of the Guard—the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes[430]—that he was restricted.