At the same time it is clear that Gneisenau, in ordering Zieten and Pirch I. to Wavre, had taken the necessary preliminary steps to effect a concentration of the whole army at that place, from which a movement for the assistance of Wellington, if he should be willing to accept battle at Waterloo, could be made. This union with the Anglo-Dutch army was, therefore, naturally regarded by the Prussian officers and soldiers as the real object of the movement to Wavre.[518] It may be that Gneisenau himself gave his orders with the sole intention of bringing about a union of the two allied armies.[519] But this is doubtful. It is more likely that he ordered a retreat on Wavre, knowing that this alone could render such a union possible, and leaving its practicability and advisability to be determined afterwards. It must be remembered that the step which Gneisenau had taken involved a temporary change of base, with all the many inconveniences and risks therefrom resulting. The communications with Namur must be abandoned. No such course as this had been thought of when Marshal Blücher decided on accepting battle at Ligny; if it had been, he would have posted his troops very differently, as we have had occasion to observe.[520] Gneisenau, however, though disappointed at not receiving help from the English during the battle, yet influenced, very possibly, by the fact that Wellington had successfully held his ground against the attack of the French left wing,[521] was extremely unwilling to renounce, by retiring on Namur, all hopes of another battle to be fought in coöperation with the English. Hence he determined to take at any rate the first steps to make it possible to fight such a battle; and in the absence of his chief, and in the confusion and turmoil which followed the successful charge of the Imperial Guard, he did not hesitate to take the responsibility of ordering the beaten corps to retire on Wavre.[522]