The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
[506] Hamley contends that the injunction to Grouchy—which, by the way,
is contained in both the written and the verbal orders,—to communicate
with Napoleon by the Namur-Quatre Bras turnpike, is not consistent with
a movement towards Wavre. But why should not this arrangement have
been prescribed for the sake of greater safety? If the Prussians were
moving towards Wavre and the Dyle, their cavalry might be expected to
make all communication across the country very hazardous for couriers
or staff-officers. And, as a matter of fact, it was by the Brussels
turnpike to Quatre Bras, thence by the Namur turnpike to Sombreffe, and
thence _via_ Gembloux to Grouchy’s position in front of Wavre, that
Napoleon sent Grouchy the two orders on the day of the battle. Napoléon
à Waterloo, pp. 277, 278.
[507] Hooper, p. 153.
[508] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 241, 242.
[509] Assuming, that is, that it was wise in Napoleon to detach Grouchy
with his two corps from the main army after he had reason to apprehend
that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English. See
the Notes to Chapter XV; _post_, pp. 273 _et seq._
[510] Maurice, p. 348: July, 1890.
[511] Ib., p. 353.
[512] Ib., pp. 350-355.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON.
Zieten and Pirch I. fell back after the battle of Ligny, as has
been above stated,[513] in the direction of Wavre. Gneisenau, the
chief-of-staff of the Prussian army, on whom, in the absence of
Marshal Blücher, who was unhorsed and quite seriously bruised in a
cavalry encounter at the end of the day, and was supposed to have been
taken prisoner,[514] the command devolved, gave the order at first for
the two beaten corps[515] to retire on Tilly, and then, as one of his
staff-officers called his attention to the fact that Tilly was not
on all the maps, he substituted Wavre for Tilly as the point to be
reached.[516]
This step involved obviously the renunciation of the line of Namur.
It implied also that the IIId and IVth Corps, those of Thielemann and
Bülow, would be ordered to retire in the general direction of Wavre,
so that a union of the whole army might be effected somewhere to the
northward. But it did not necessarily imply that this union of the army
would be effected at Wavre; or even that, if effected at Wavre, it
would be followed by an attempt to unite with the Anglo-Dutch army. It
was quite possible that the two beaten corps might, after reforming
at Wavre, be ordered in the direction of Maestricht, towards which
place the IIId and IVth Corps might also be ordered to retire. In fact,
this was the interpretation put by General Thielemann on the facts
as he first learned them. He wrote to Bülow,[517] that he had heard
nothing from the Marshal, but supposed that the intention was that the
Ist and IId Corps were to fall back from Wavre towards St. Trond, which
is a town in the direction of Maestricht, some 35 miles from Wavre.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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