The bridge of Limale carried by the French between 6 and 7 P.M. 265 Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy 265 Analysis of this order 266 Its main object 266 It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course 267 Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructions given to Marbot 268-270 The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon 270 The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy 270, 271 Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on Grouchy 272 The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor had become alarmed 272 NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 273 1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000 men considered 273 This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur 273 For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch army 274 But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that Blücher might have undertaken to join Wellington 274 In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move 275 Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct warning 276 Risks incurred by this course 276 It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army 277 2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment of Grouchy 277 But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off Blücher 278 3. Importance of treating independently of the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy 279 4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper course given and commented on 280 5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched for Moustier at daybreak 281 It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his march 281 Charras, however, is of a different opinion 282 Examination of his views 282 Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M. 283