The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
Taking the two letters together,—and leaving out of view for the moment
the postscript of the second,—we see that Napoleon was expecting that
Grouchy would approach him. He had learned of the “pretty strong
column” which had passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre. He,
no doubt, supposed that Grouchy had also learned of it; and he knew
from Grouchy’s despatches of 10 P.M. of the 17th and 2 A.M. of the
18th, that Grouchy had recognized the necessity of manœuvring in the
direction of Wavre, if the mass of the Prussian army should have taken
that course. Hence he expected to see him. He thought it likely that
he would come by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, and strike in
on his right and keep off any of the enemy’s troops who might seek to
molest him.
Of any apprehension of a serious attack by the Prussians in force there
is no trace till we come to the postscript to the second letter. Up
to the time when this postscript was written, Napoleon would seem to
have felt pretty sure (though perhaps with some misgivings), either
that Grouchy would prevent the Prussians from attacking him, or would
himself join, or connect with, the main army. But the appearance of
the Prussians at St. Lambert and the absence of any information from
Grouchy evidently alarmed him.
FOOTNOTES:
[561] Mém. du Duc de Raguse, vol. 7, pp. 124, 125.
[562] Soult’s despatch to Grouchy: June 18th, 10 A.M.
[563] Even if the Emperor had been asleep when Grouchy’s aide arrived,
or had been at the front, where he was between one and two o’clock
in the morning, to see if the English army was still in position, a
competent chief-of-staff should, of his own motion, have sent back at
once to Grouchy the information possessed at headquarters.
[564] Especially when, according to Marshal Marmont, the subordinate
was a man like Grouchy: Mém., vol. 4, p. 125. See, also, Napoléon à
Waterloo, p. 226, n.
[565] Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 _et seq._; Gérard: Dern. Obs. p. 44.
[566] _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 232, 233, 245.
[567] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 70, 87, 131, n.
[568] Gardner, pp. 160, 161. The italics are our own.
[569] Ib., pp. 161, 162.
[570] Maurice, p. 550: Sept. 1890., The italics are our own. It is
possible that Colonel Maurice may have had in mind the language of
Soult’s order dated 10 A.M., in which Grouchy’s movement on Wavre is
approved. But this did not reach Grouchy till 4 P.M., as we have just
stated. See, also, Kennedy, p. 159.
[571] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 315, n. 1. The hour of starting is given
in the Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 56) as “before four o’clock.” But
this is a gross and manifest error. _Cf._ Charras, vol. 2, p. 33, where
the hour is given as 6 A.M.
[572] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 1; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4. p. 55.
[573] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 2; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 57.
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