In this discussion we shall assume the correctness of our conclusions, reached previously, that if Grouchy had started at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or even if he had followed the counsel of Gérard, he would almost certainly have prevented Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from taking any part in the battle.[753] We shall not reargue these questions, for they have been already fully discussed. Let us suppose, then, that Napoleon could have utilized his whole force against the army of Wellington during the whole afternoon; that he could have given his personal direction to the conduct of the action; that he could have followed up the repulse of the 1st Corps with a new attack in which Lobau should support d’Erlon, and in which the cavalry should take its proper part; that he had been on the spot when La Haye Sainte fell, and had improved that advantage as he well knew how to do; that he had had the whole of the Imperial Guard—infantry, cavalry, and artillery,—at his disposal for the carrying of Wellington’s position; it seems to us there can be no reasonable question as to the result; the Duke would have been badly beaten, and the action would in all probability have been over, or substantially so, by six o’clock. This question is not asked to gratify the imagination, or for purposes of speculation, but simply that we may form a judgment on the adequacy of Napoleon’s means to the end which he had in view; for, if military history cannot assist us in forming correct opinions on the adequacy of certain available means to the attainment of certain proposed objects, it is of no use whatever. The view we hold as to the necessity of Blüchers support to Wellington’s success is the same as that which we have seen[754] put forth by Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, where he is justifying the Duke for accepting battle at Waterloo.[755] As for Zieten, he could not have come up till half-past seven o’clock, which would have been too late for him to be of any use to the English. The probability is that he would have joined the other corps that were fighting Grouchy. It is hardly likely that he would have pursued his intention of joining Wellington, after he had heard that the other three corps were not likely to interfere in the battle between Napoleon and Wellington. This would have been to run a great risk; and one that under the circumstances no prudent officer would run. We are supposing now that Zieten hears at Ohain, for instance, that the other corps are engaged with Grouchy at St. Lambert or Couture,—now, then, he must admit that if Grouchy shall be able, owing to obstinate or skilful fighting, or to the lateness of the hour, or to chance, to prevent Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from attacking Napoleon that afternoon, the chances are that Napoleon will defeat Wellington before he, Zieten, can possibly arrive; and, therefore, for him to proceed further than Ohain will simply be to involve himself in the disaster of the Anglo-Dutch army.