But while we must state our conviction that Grouchy would have prevented the defeat of Napoleon had he crossed the Dyle, we certainly do not consider him the sole cause of the defeat. FOOTNOTES: [671] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 219; Charras, vol. 1, p. 263. [672] Drouet, pp. 96, 97; Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, p. 24. [673] _Ante_, pp. 268 _et seq._ [674] The question of the alleged orders sent to Grouchy during this night will be treated of in Appendix A; _post_, p. 353. [675] Van Loben Sels, p. 319. [676] _Ante_, p. 265. [677] Charras, vol. 1, p. 265. [678] Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, 24. [679] Van Loben Sels, p. 270. [680] Baudus, vol. 1, p. 225. [681] Doc. Inéd., XVIII, p. 52; App. C, xxxi; _post_, p. 387. [682] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 157, n. [683] Charras, vol. 1, p. 270. [684] Charras, vol. 1, p. 274. [685] Ib., p. 275. [686] Kennedy, p. 131. [687] Wellington’s Official Report: Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 481. [688] Oldfield MSS.; Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 380. A copy of this sketch is inserted opposite page 565 of C. D. Yonge’s “Life of Wellington”; London: Chapman and Hall; 1860. See, also, p. 616 of the same work. [689] Curiously enough they were very nearly lost in the action; the officer who had them in his keeping, Lieutenant Waters, being unhorsed in the _melée_. [690] Probably the information brought by Lieutenant Massow; _ante_, p. 233. [691] Oldfield MSS. [692] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461; App. xxx. Charras, vol. 1, p. 269, n. 2, raises the total to 70,187 men of all arms, of whom 13,432 were cavalry. He gives the number of guns as 159. [693] _Ante_, p. 35, n. 3. [694] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461: App. xxx. [695] Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the 6th British division, was not in the action. [696] Kennedy, p. 61; Waterloo Letters, pp. 30, 31, Sir W. Gomm. [697] Waterloo Letters, pp. 403, 404. [698] Kennedy, p. 65. [699] Oldfield MSS. [700] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 461: App. xxxi. Charras (vol. 1. p. 238, n.) gives the total as 72,447 men and 240 guns. [701] Doc. Inéd., XIX, pp. 53, 54; App. C, xxxii; _post_, p. 388. [702] We shall not attempt to give a complete tactical description of the battle of Waterloo. The narratives of Siborne, Charras, Hooper, La Tour d’Auvergne, and others give all the facts. With the exception of two or three points, their accounts do not differ materially. [703] The following extract from a letter by Baron Müffling written on June 24, 1815, is directly in point here:— “Before we arrived there I said to the Duke, ‘If only there were an apparently weak point in the right flank of your position, so that Bonaparte might assail it right furiously, and neglect his own right wing to such an extent that he should fail to discover the march of the Prussians!’ “And see! when we arrived there, there lay the advanced post of Hougomont, upon which he (B.) indeed fell.” Militär Wochenblatt, Nov. 14, 1891. [704] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 266; Charras, vol. 1, p. 281. [705] Charras, vol. 2, p. 18.