The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
“The advance of such weak battalions, with the great gaps between,
appeared hazardous, and General Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the
cavalry, drew the Duke’s attention to the danger; the Duke, however,
would not order them to stop. * * * The Duke with his practised
eye perceived that the French army was no longer dangerous; he was
equally aware, indeed, that, with his infantry so diminished, he
could achieve nothing more of importance: but if he _stood still_,
and resigned the pursuit to the Prussian army _alone_, it might
appear in the eyes of Europe as if the English army had defended
themselves bravely indeed, but that the Prussians alone decided and
won the battle.”
The rout of the divisions of Durutte and Marcognet was entirely due
to Zieten’s attack; this is universally admitted. Had it not been for
Zieten, then, the only contest that would have gone on that evening
would have been at and near Planchenoit; and it is hard to suppose
that Napoleon could not have maintained his position there, if he had
had his whole army to draw from when the Young Guard and Lobau needed
reinforcements. To the unexpected irruption of Zieten’s Corps,—or
rather of his leading division of infantry, all his cavalry, and most
of his artillery,—arriving at the close of the day, on the flank of the
army, and in perfectly open ground, is the rout of the French army,
therefore, principally to be attributed.
8. It only remains to discuss the question of the responsibility for
the intervention of the Prussians, as between the Emperor and Marshal
Grouchy. It may fairly be said that if either of them had taken all
the steps which the situation, as it presented itself to his mind,
demanded, this intervention might have been prevented.
If the Emperor, when he thought it possible that the Prussians might be
intending to unite with the English, had taken Grouchy with him, and
had stationed his two corps, or one of them, on the day of the battle,
at or near Lasne and St. Lambert, or if he had employed one or both of
Grouchy’s corps in attacking the English, Blücher, it is safe to say,
would not have interfered in the duel between Napoleon and Wellington.
If, after sending Grouchy off, Napoleon had informed him of the
impending battle, and had charged him to return to the main army by
way of Moustier if he found that the Prussians had gone to Wavre, it
is altogether probable that the march of the Prussians would have been
arrested.
On the other hand, if Grouchy had acted of his own motion on sound
military principles at daybreak of the 18th, or even had been willing
to follow the counsel of Gérard at noon, the same result would probably
have been attained.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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