Napoleon took a wholly unnecessary risk when he detached Grouchy with such a large force, after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, and he negligently omitted to take the usual means to reduce this risk by supplying his lieutenant with the necessary information, and with precise orders in case he should find that Blücher intended to coöperate with Wellington. He trusted to Grouchy to take the right course, and Grouchy failed to do so. Both Napoleon and Grouchy are therefore responsible for the intervention of the Prussians and the loss of the battle. FOOTNOTES: [756] _Ante_, pp. 303, 304. [757] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 343; Jones, p. 384. [758] Jones, p. 387. [759] Ib., p. 227. [760] Sidney’s Life of Lord Hill, p. 309. [761] Jones (Artillery Operations), p. 177; Sharpin in the “Waterloo Letters,” pp. 228 _et seq._; Gore, pp. 58 _et seq._ See, also, Captain Batty’s account (pp. 106 _et seq._,) in his “Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815”: London, 1820. He was an ensign in the 1st regiment of foot-guards in Maitland’s brigade. He speaks, it is true, of the chasseurs of the Guard “forming another attack”; but he says that it was when Maitland was advancing, that he perceived the chasseurs “so far advanced as to menace the right flank of the brigade,”—which is substantially the view maintained in the text. _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 2, p. 170, where the same statement is made. Yet Siborne (vol. 2, p. 174) says that “between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a distance during their advance of _from ten to twelve minutes’ march_.” How such an interval was possible, when the contest of the Guard with Maitland’s brigade was of such extremely short duration, is not apparent. See Maitland’s statement in “Waterloo Letters”, pp. 244, 245; also statements of Powell and Dirom; pp. 255, 257, 258. [762] Gawler, p. 15. [763] Ib. pp. 31, 32. [764] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84. [765] Lord Seaton, then Sir John Colborne, who commanded the 52d, admits that he did not himself see, and could not have seen, any movement of the guards. He simply claims that the Imperial Guard halted when his skirmishers opened fire on their flank. Leeke, vol. 1, p. 101. [766] Ib., pp. 43, 44, 84. [767] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84. See also his letter to the Editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, August 17, 1867. [768] Waterloo Letters, p. 229. _Cf._ a statement of an officer in the same battery,—Jones, p. 177,—probably Sharpin. [769] Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255. [770] Waterloo Letters, p. 257. [771] Ib., p. 293; _Cf._ Colborne’s Letter, p. 285. [772] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 104; Letter of Colonel Brotherton. [773] Ib., p. 101. [774] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321. [775] Wellington brought up about this time to the right centre of his line Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division, besides other troops.