[776] Wellington about this time brought over the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to the threatened centre of his line, as well as the remnants of Somerset’s and Ponsonby’s brigades. [777] On Marshal Ney’s state of mind at this time, see Gourgaud, pp. 48, n.; 111, 112; Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 249, 250; Muquardt, p. 149, n.; Life of Sir W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505,—where Soult gives his opinion on Ney’s conduct; Berton, p. 41, where Ney’s extraordinary letter to Fouché (Jones, pp. 385 _et seq._) is examined. [778] Chesney, p. 217; Hamley, p. 198. [779] Kennedy, p. 174. [780] Müffling; Passages, p. 249. [781] Müffling; Passages, p. 250. CHAPTER XVII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. The justification for this book on the well-worn subject of the campaign of Waterloo is to be found, if at all, in its treatment of certain topics to which we now propose very briefly to advert. 1. First among them is Napoleon’s plan of campaign.[782] In regard to this we have followed his own account, and have pointed out the difference between it and the plan which it has been claimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained. 2. In regard to the much-vexed question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light, it is submitted, has been thrown.[783] The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin, and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818, make it very difficult to disbelieve Napoleon’s account of this matter. 3. The true cause of the delay on the morning of the 16th of June has been, we submit, pointed out.[784] The fact that d’Erlon’s Corps was so far in the rear seems to have been the chief reason for delaying the forward movement both of the left wing and of the main army. 4. It has been shown by Marshal Ney’s orders to his command, and from other evidence furnished by his defenders, that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the 16th were extremely defective, and, in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his orders.[785] It has also been shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received would in all probability have changed the issue of the campaign.[786] 5. In regard to the movements of d’Erlon’s Corps on the 16th, it has been shown that its leading division was two hours and a half behind the rear divisions of the 2d Corps on the road to Quatre Bras; and that if d’Erlon’s Corps had closely followed the rear division of the 2d Corps, it could not have been turned aside by the staff-officer’s blunder.[787] 6. Attention has been called to Napoleon’s plan of battle at Ligny, and to the criticisms which it has met with.[788] 7. The view of those writers who regard it as great negligence on the part of Napoleon that on the morning of the 17th he did not take adequate measures to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, is fully adopted.[789]