99 Mount Vernon Street: Boston: May 17, 1893. CONTENTS. PAGE PREFACE CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 1 The general military situation 2 Reasons for taking the offensive 2, 3 Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and Blücher 3 Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies 3, 4 Napoleon’s plan 4 As stated in Gourgaud’s Narrative 4 And in the “Memoirs” 5 The other plans which were open to him 6 His expectation that Blücher would accept battle single-handed 7, 8 NOTE TO CHAPTER I 9 Napoleon’s plan distinguished from certain other plans attributed to him 9 Alison’s view that he threw himself between the two allied armies 10 Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz 10 But adopted by Hooper and Quinet 11 Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day 12 Jomini’s belief, that he did have this intention 12 Adopted by La Tour d’Auvergne 13 And by Charras 13 Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Wellington and Clausewitz 13 Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the Prussians 14, 15 CHAPTER II: THE FRENCH ARMY 16 The army as affected by Napoleon’s return from Elba 16 Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon 17 Lack of confidence in the high officers 17 Napoleon’s choice of Soult to take Berthier’s place 17 Soult’s unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff 18 The five corps-commanders 18 Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras 19 Probability of the truth of their views 19 What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants 20 Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment 20 Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to the command of the right wing 21