1. Marshal Ney was acting under considerable disadvantage during this afternoon and evening. We have spoken of this subject before. His difficulties are well pointed out by Colonel Maurice in a recent paper,[94] in which much stress is laid, and very justly, on the fact that Ney had not with him a proper staff. It is true that Ney was no neophyte in the practice of war, and that he was perfectly well known to his corps-commanders, and in fact to his entire command. But he arrived at the front late in the day,—at nearly five o’clock in the afternoon,—and with but a single staff-officer. It was only natural and right that he should personally occupy himself with the conduct of the advance to Frasnes, that he should accompany the cavalry, and should attend to the posting of Bachelu’s infantry division in support. And he may very possibly have found the leading division of the 1st Corps, Durutte’s, between Jumet and Gosselies[95] on his return, late in the evening, from Frasnes to the latter place. That the 1st Corps had not fully executed its part of the programme must have been, however, only too plain to him; and the necessity of exerting himself energetically to bring it up to the front[96] if he would have his whole command well in hand for to-morrow’s work must have appeared, in view of d’Erlon’s slowness, most imperative. At least, there is every reason to suppose this. 2. As to whether Napoleon accomplished as much as he had intended to accomplish, or as much as he ought to have intended to accomplish, on this day of the fifteenth of June, writers have differed. Those who, like Jomini and Charras,[97] maintain the theory that his intention was to seize both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras at once, and those who, like Rogniat, insist that this ought to have been his intention, whatever it may in reality have been, hold that the operations of this first day were incomplete. Jomini says:—[98] “Napoleon had to renounce the idea of pushing on the 15th as far as Sombreffe and Quatre Bras, which were to be the pivots of all his after movements.” “One may feel assured,” says Charras,[99] “that the haste which Napoleon intended should characterize the march of the army had for its object the occupation of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day of the campaign. This occupation failed, in consequence of a considerable loss of time; the principal avenue of communication between Blücher and Wellington remained free, although menaced; it is for this reason that we hold that Napoleon told the truth in writing that ‘this loss of time was very injurious’ and that we add,—the day of the 15th had been incomplete.” The passage to which Charras here refers is to be found in the Memoirs,[100] and it runs thus:—