“On the same day [the 15th], the attack of the woods before Fleurus, which had been ordered to commence at four o’clock in the afternoon, did not take place until seven o’clock. Night came on before the troops could enter Fleurus, where it had been the project of the chief to place his headquarters that very day. This loss of seven [_sic_][101] hours was very injurious at the opening of a campaign.” A. Let us first consider this question so far as it affects the operations of the centre and right of the army,—that is, with reference to the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the 15th. Rogniat’s criticism, that the Emperor ought to have aimed at seizing Sombreffe on the 15th, is especially interesting, as it was answered by Napoleon himself from St. Helena. “He [Napoleon] ought to have carried his whole army the same day as far as Fleurus, by a forced march of eight to ten leagues, and to have pushed his advance guard as far as Sombreffe; but, instead of hastening to arrive in the midst of his enemies, he stopped at Charleroi, whether because he was retarded by the bad weather or for other motives.”[102] To this Napoleon replied:—[103] “The Emperor’s intention was that his advance guard should occupy Fleurus,[104] keeping [the bulk of] his troops concealed behind the wood near this city;[105] he took good care not to let his army be seen, _and, above all, not to occupy Sombreffe_.[106] This [the occupation of Sombreffe] would of itself have caused the failure of all his manœuvres; for then Marshal Blücher would have been obliged to make Wavre the place for the concentration of his army, the battle of Ligny would not have taken place, and the Prussian army would not have been obliged to give battle [as it did] in its then not fully concentrated condition, and not supported by the English army.” In his “Réponse aux Notes critiques de Napoléon,”[107] Rogniat criticises this observation as follows:— “In occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon would have won, without striking a blow, the immense result of isolating the two opposing armies in order to fight them separately, a result which the victory of Ligny, so dearly purchased, did not obtain for him.”[108] While Rogniat thus condemns Napoleon for not having proposed to himself to occupy Sombreffe on the 15th, Charras[109] summarily dismisses Napoleon’s statement just quoted, as unworthy of serious attention. Not to have aimed at occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, he says, would have been contrary to “the very principles of his strategy.” He accordingly finds that in this respect Napoleon had failed on the evening of the 15th to attain his objective point. Jomini’s view[110] of Napoleon’s plan, as we have seen above, coincides with that of Charras.[111]