The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
these sayings of Soult and Heymès rest on mere hearsay evidence, and
that they were spoken, if spoken at all, many years after the campaign,
it is evident that the statement in the bulletin is by far the best
evidence that we have. The mention of Quatre Bras in the bulletin was
made at the time,—before any controversy had arisen,—it was moreover a
mere incidental mention, and cannot be supposed to have been intended
to serve a purpose of any kind.
Where the evidence is so conflicting, it is impossible for many persons
to make up their minds. As we remarked before, the matter is not one of
any great importance in its bearing on the fortunes of the campaign.
The question, whether Ney received at five in the afternoon of the
15th of June verbal orders to seize Quatre Bras that evening, is of
consequence mainly with reference to the scope of Napoleon’s plan at
that moment, and also with respect to his reproach of unwarrantable
hesitation on the part of Marshal Ney. It seems to us, we frankly say,
on the whole, almost certain that the order was given. At any rate, we
can hardly doubt that, when the bulletin was sent off that evening to
Paris, it was believed at the headquarters of the army that Marshal Ney
was at Quatre Bras; we must admit this, unless we gratuitously invent
an intention to deceive the public on a point of this kind. And as Ney
could hardly have been supposed to occupy Quatre Bras without orders,
he must have been supposed by those who drew up the bulletin,—that is,
Soult, the chief-of-staff of the army, and the Emperor himself,—to
have proceeded to Quatre Bras in conformity with the verbal order given
him that afternoon.[132]
The fact that the subsequent written orders to proceed to Quatre Bras,
issued on the morning of the 16th, make no mention either of this
verbal order, or of Ney’s failure to comply with it, does not seem
to us to tend in any way to show that the verbal order had not been
given. There would not only be no need of referring to such a fact in a
subsequent written order, but such a mention of it would be unusual and
unmilitary.[133] What light, if any, the contents of the written orders
throw on the question of the previous giving of a verbal order, is a
matter that will be considered hereafter.
FOOTNOTES:
[94] United Service Magazine: Sept., 1890: pp. 541 _et seq._
[95] Doc. Inéd., p. 71. Statement of General Durutte. As we have before
remarked, this officer probably mistook Jumet for Gosselies. See
_ante_, p. 50, note 25.
[96] “An error was committed by suffering it [the 1st Corps] to remain,
during the night of the 15th, echeloned between Marchienne and Jumet.”
Gourg. p. 66.
[97] _Ante_, pp. 12, 13.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account