[98] Jomini, p. 125. Jomini says (p. 123) that “Napoleon gave Grouchy a verbal order to push as far as Sombreffe that very evening, if possible”; but no evidence of such an order is cited. See Jomini’s letter to the Duc d’Elchingen, pp. 225, 226. _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 69. That Napoleon nowhere blames Grouchy for not having pushed on to Sombreffe on the 15th,—taken in connection with his censure of Ney for not having seized Quatre Bras that evening,—is pretty good evidence that he neither ordered nor expected Grouchy to reach Sombreffe. [99] Charras, vol. 1, p. 116: _cf._ vol. 2, p. 225, Note K. [100] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249. [101] Evidently a misprint for “three”; the word “seven” having obviously been carelessly repeated. [102] Rogniat: Consid., p. 339: cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471. [103] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471. [104] Rogniat claims that there is a serious inconsistency between this statement, as to the occupation of Fleurus by the advance guard, and that in the Memoirs, where it is said that the Emperor intended to place his headquarters there. This seems rather hypercritical. Charras (vol. 2, p. 221) says “It stands to reason that if he had had his headquarters in that city [Fleurus], he would have occupied Sombreffe.” But this is surely going too far. Headquarters might well have been in Fleurus, while the Prussians held the heights of Brye and Sombreffe, and even the villages of Ligny and St. Amand; and this actually was the case the next day,—the 16th. Fleurus, half way between Charleroi and Sombreffe, was a very natural place for the Emperor to aim at as his resting place for the night of the 15th. [105] Clausewitz, ch. 30, p. 60. But see Rogniat, Réponse, p. 262. [106] The italics are our own. [107] pp. 264, 265. [108] It is not easy to see what is meant here. It is certain that, without having occupied Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon did fight the Prussians separately on the 16th. That Ligny was not a more decisive victory was due to special causes. [109] Vol. 1, p. 115, note. Quinet, p. 102, does not follow Charras here. [110] Jomini, pp. 123, 125. [111] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 73 _et seq._ takes the same view. [112] Vaudoncourt, vol. 3, 2d part, pp. 134, 135, states the Emperor’s plan with admirable clearness. But on pp. 165, 166, he slides into the theory of Jomini. [113] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 22, p. 46. “It was certainly to be assumed that both generals would remain in communication with each other.” [114] “Bonaparte hoped, if he met Blücher’s main body, to destroy it by a quick attack, before Wellington could arrive.” Ib., ch. 22, p. 46. [115] But see La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 75, 76. [116] Jomini, pp. 125, 215. [117] Charras, vol. 1, p. 124. _Cf._ Quinet, p. 102. [118] _Ante_, pp. 51, 52. Gourg. p. 66. [119] Gourgaud, p. 47. [120] Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199.