India -- History -- British occupation, 1765-1947; India -- Politics and government -- 1765-1947
The attitude of Afghanistan was for a long time doubtful,
although I always had confidence in the personal loyalty of our
ally the Amir; but I feared lest he might be overwhelmed by a
wave of fanaticism, or by a successful Jehad of the tribes....
It suffices to mention that, although during the previous three
years there had been no operations of any importance on the
North-West frontier, there were, between November 29, 1914, and
September 5, 1915, no less than seven serious attacks on the
North-West frontier, all of which were effectively dealt with.
The military authorities had also to meet a German conspiracy early in
1915, 7,000 men arriving from Canada and the United States, having
planned to seize points of military vantage in the Panjab, and in
December of the same year another German conspiracy in Bengal,
necessitating military preparations on land, and also naval patrols in
the Bay of Bengal.
Lord Hardinge has been much attacked by the Tory and Unionist Press in
England and India, in England because of the Mesopotamia Report, in
India because his love for India brought him hatred from Anglo-India.
India has affirmed her confidence in him, and with India’s verdict he
may well rest satisfied.
I do not care to dwell on the Mesopotamia Commission and its
condemnation of the bureaucratic system prevailing here. Lord Hardinge
vindicated himself and India. The bureaucratic system remains
undefended. I recall that bureaucratic inefficiency came out in even
more startling fashion in connection with the Afghan War of 1878-79 and
1879-80. In February 1880, the war charges were reported as under £4
millions, and the accounts showed a surplus of £2 millions. On April 8th
the Government of India reported: “Outgoing for War very alarming, far
exceeding estimate,” and on the 13th April “it was announced that the
cash balances had fallen in three months from thirteen crores to less
than nine, owing to ‘excessive Military drain’ ... On the following day
(April 22) a despatch was sent out to the Viceroy, showing that there
appeared a deficiency of not less than 5-1/4 crores. This vast error was
evidently due to an underestimate of war liabilities, which had led to
such mis-information being laid before Parliament, and to the sudden
discovery of inability to ‘meet the usual drawings.’”
It seemed that the Government knew only the amount audited, not the
amount spent. Payments were entered as “advances,” though they were not
recoverable, and “the great negligence was evidently that of the heads
of departmental accounts.” If such a mishap should occur under Home
Rule, a few years hence--which heaven forbid--I shudder to think of the
comments of the _Englishman_ and the _Madras Mail_ on the shocking
inefficiency of Indian officials.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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