The Catholic World, Vol. 04, October, 1866 to March, 1867 — John Shaqi
The Catholic World, Vol. 04, October, 1866 to March, 1867Various
Religion
The Catholic World, Vol. 04, October, 1866 to March, 1867
Various
Catholic Church -- Periodicals
simple and indivisible in itself, and divided from everything else, or
it cannot be an original and primary component. For, however far the
analysis of a composite may be carried, it may be carried further,
unless it has been analysed to its simple constituent parts which are
not themselves composite, and therefore simple. It is of no avail to
take refuge in the notion of the infinite divisibility of matter. For,
apart from the absurdity of the infinite series contained in this
notion, one of these infinitesimal entities could certainly be divided
from all others by the power of God and made intelligible to the human
understanding. And the very question under discussion is, What is the
intelligible essence of this ultimate entity?
[Footnote 4: The philosophical works of Leibnitz may be consulted
for a thorough exposition of this doctrine. Also the Philosophical
Manuals of F. Rothenflue, S.J., and the Abbé Branchereau of the
Society of St. Sulpice. The philosophical articles of Dr. Brownson
in his Review contain some incidental arguments of great value on
the same topic. P. Dalgairns of the London Oratory, also treats,
with the ability and clearness which characterize all his writings,
of this subject, at considerable length, in his work on the Holy
Communion.]
[Footnote 5: By "imaginary conceptions" is not meant fanciful,
unreal conceptions, but conceptions of the imaginative as and
intellectual facility which reflects the real.]
Another proof that material substance is something intelligible and
not something sensible, is, that it has a relation to spiritual
substance, and therefore something cognate to spirit in its essence.
The Abbé Branchereau defines relation: "Proprietatem qua duo aut plura
entia ita se habeat ad invicem, ut unius conceptus conceptum alterius
includat aut supponat." "A property by which two or more entities are
so constituted in reference to one another, that the conception of one
includes or suppose the conception of the other." [Footnote 6]
[Footnote 6: Praelect. Philos. De Relat. Entis. Num. 108, 8.]
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