“Duration without an end ... is the same as immortality” (p. 98). If the earth is to last without an end, shall we call it immortal? “Perfections are modifications of beings” (p. 107). This proposition, as understood by the author, who extends it to all the perfections of contingent beings, is evidently false. “The Scotists teach that there is a real distinction among God’s attributes” (p. 115). By no means. The Scotists would never have taught such a gross error. They taught that the distinction between God’s absolute attributes was a _formal_, and not a _real_, distinction. “For God, the interior acts are those whose object is himself” (p. 123). There are not many interior acts in God, as the author implies, but one permanent act only. “It appears difficult to reconcile the immutability of God with his liberty. Three systems have been formed for this purpose, but they are not satisfactory” (p. 124). If the author had considered that God’s liberty is all _ad extra_, and not _ad intra_, he would have seen that he had no right to qualify as he does the theological solution of the present difficulty. Each of the three solutions is satisfactory, at least in this sense: that each of them sets at naught the objections of the opponents. This is all we need. As to which of the three solutions is the best, it is not our duty to decide. “Immensity means the same as omnipresence” (p. 130). This is not true. Omnipresence is relative, and its range is measured by the actual existence of creatures, as it does not extend beyond creation; while immensity is absolute, and transcends all created things. “S. Thomas says that God also sees future free and contingent things in their essence—that is, that he sees them in his eternal and immutable decrees” (p. 133). Does the author mean that S. Thomas considers the essence of contingent things as equivalent to the eternal and immutable decrees? “But Molina and his disciples contend that with such a system (S. Thomas’s) it is impossible to defend human liberty” (p. 133). Here Molina and his disciples are represented as the decided adversaries of the Angelic Doctor. It is not fair. The author should have remembered that S. Thomas’s doctrine is variously explained by various writers, and that it is possible to be a follower of S. Thomas without being a _Thomist_ in the usual sense given to this word. “Veracity consists in this: that a being can neither deceive nor be deceived” (p. 134). Shall we deny the author’s veracity because he has been sometimes deceived? “Justice is the attribute according to which we give to others what belongs to them” (p. 135). Justice with us is a virtue, not an attribute; with God, justice is an attribute, but does not consist in giving to others what _belongs_ to them; it consists in giving to others what the order of reason demands. “Providence is, therefore, a continuous creation” (p. 137). The mistake is evident. It is conservation, not providence, that is thus defined.