“The action of God upon us during life is constant, and this is what we mean by his providence” (p. 137). This is another mistake. The author confounds the notion of providence with that of _concursus_. “In regard to its wrong use (of liberty), God cannot have an immediate, but only a mediate, influence on man’s actions, in the sense that he has granted liberty of which a bad use is made against his suggestions. His sanctity forbids that he should act immediately in that case” (p. 138). Not at all. God _immediately_ concurs to all our actions, whether good or bad, as every theologian knows, inasmuch as they are physical actions; and concurs neither immediately nor mediately to their badness, because their badness is nothing but a privation, and therefore requires no efficient cause. The author misrepresents (pp. 138, 139) the doctrine of the Molinists concerning the influence (_concursus_) of God upon our actions. He says that this influence, according to the Molinists, “is positive and direct, but _not on our will_,” and “consists in affording a concourse of circumstances the most suitable for the determination.” The author may have found this interpretation of Molina’s doctrine in some old book; but it is known that the Molinists have always admitted God’s influence “on our will,” though they never admitted the physical predetermination; and it is no less certain that none of them maintain that “a concourse of circumstances” suffices to explain God’s influence on our free actions.