The Catholic World, Vol. 21, April, 1875, to September, 1875: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and ScienceVarious
Religion
The Catholic World, Vol. 21, April, 1875, to September, 1875: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and Science
Various
Catholic Church -- Periodicals
The old philosophers, who admitted the separability of the matter from
its substantial form, and who were for this reason obliged to grant to
such a matter an imperfect being, were wont to say that the matter was
_con-created_ with the form, and thus they seem to have conceived the
creation of a primitive material substance as including two partial
creations. But, as a primitive being includes but _one_ act, it cannot be
the term of _two_ actions; for two actions imply two acts. On the other
hand, the matter which is under the substantial act has no entity of its
own, as we have shown to be the true and common doctrine, and therefore
has no need of a special effection, but only of a formal actuation. Hence
the creation of a primitive material substance does not consist of two
partial creations. We may, however, adopt the term “_con-created_” to
express the fact that the position of the act entails the reality of the
potential term, just as the position of sphericity entails the existence
of a centre.
The preceding remarks have been made with the object of preparing the
solution of a difficulty concerning the creation of matter. For matter
is potential, whilst God is a pure act without potency; but a pure
act without potency cannot produce anything potential, since it does
not contain in itself any potentiality nor anything equivalent to it.
Therefore the origin of matter cannot be accounted for by creation.
The answer to this difficulty is as follows: We grant that the matter, as
distinguished from the form which gives it the first being, and therefore
as a potential term of the primitive substance, cannot be created, for
it is no being at all, but only a potency of being; and yet it does not
follow that the material substance itself cannot be created. Of course
God does not contain in himself, either formally or eminently, the
potentiality of his own creatures, but he eminently contains in himself
and can produce out of himself an endless multitude of acts giving
existence to as many potential terms. And thus God, by producing any such
act, causes the existence of its correspondent potency, which is not
efficiently made, but only formally actuated, as has been just explained.
Creation is an action, and action is the production of an act; hence
“the term of creation is _a being in act_, and this act is the form,” as
St. Thomas teaches; the matter, on the contrary, or the potency of the
created being, is a term coming out of nothingness by formal actuation,
and consequently having no being of its own, but owing whatever existence
it has to the act or form of which it is the term; so that, if God ceased
to conserve such an act, the term would instantly vanish altogether
without need of a special annihilation. Nothingness is the source of all
potentiality and imperfection, as God is the source of all actuality and
perfection. Hence even the spiritual creatures, in which there is no
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