The Chautauquan, Vol. 05, April 1885Chautauqua Literary and Scientific Circle
Philosophy
The Chautauquan, Vol. 05, April 1885
Chautauqua Literary and Scientific Circle
Chautauqua Institution -- Periodicals; Chautauqua Literary and Scientific Circle -- Periodicals
When the mind is employed in discriminating, arranging, judging, and
reasoning, these several acts are all of a class, and are called rational
or logical processes. Their importance can hardly be overestimated, as
thus the reasoner gets assured possession of judgments or beliefs that
are more or less general, and derives from them those that are particular
and applicable in any exigency; or by the inductive method, from the
particular facts within his knowledge, arrives at general propositions,
and securely rests in them as true. In many, perhaps in most cases,
both processes, the deductive and inductive, are used or implied. We
understand phenomena or effects by their causes, and infer causes from
their effects, explain the present by what has been, and anticipate the
future by interpreting the past. We reason from what is seen to the
unseen, from the facts of nature to nature’s laws.
Systems of logic, if judiciously arranged, are of much value, and should
be studied as guides and helps in our efforts to know the certainty
of things. Method in reasoning is of much importance. But while
comparatively few understand the rules, or adopt the exact technical
terms used by scientific logicians, others, using methods and terms of
their own, think vigorously, and reason well. The powers employed by
the most thoroughly trained scholar and by the unlettered man may be
equal, nor are their methods half so different as some suppose. Though
the latter forms no expanded syllogisms,[1] says nothing of “subject,”
“predicate,” or “copula,” he as really has his premises, reasons from
what he knows, and in many cases reaches his conclusions with about the
same feeling of certainty. The knowledge he gains does not differ from
that of those who are guided in their reasonings by the best rules that
observation and experience suggest. Some of those, who in this matter of
logic are a law unto themselves, not only reason well, but often very
rapidly. Judgment is given so speedily on the presentation of the case
that it seems intuitive. There is but a step from the premises of an
argument, securely laid in what is conceded in the statement, or what
they already know, to the conclusion that is legitimate, and they take it
at once. Now, if this is true, and common sense reasonings often seem so
easy, while those conducted by men of much science are often difficult
and tedious, it may be asked what advantage, then, is there in the
logic of the schools? A sufficient answer is found in the fact that the
thoroughly trained logician can solve problems the other never attempts.
In his processes the properties and relations observed are less obvious
or more complicated than anything presented to the other. To apprehend
them clearly, closer attention must be given than most men, without
such training, ever give or can give. And then, the conclusions of the
ready, rapid, though untrained, reasoner who investigates only common
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account