Structurally important features are: the absence of any method of election, direct or indirect, or of any ultimate source of "sovereign" personnel--the government having borne itself out of chaos, constitutionally a remarkable feat; the elimination of even nominal party control of government, or cameral legislation, or constituent assembly, these being hated vestiges of the Chinese and Western, but not Japanese, notion that popular sovereignty is to receive genuflections if not credence; and, most startlingly, the absence of a head! There was no President, Protector, Chief of State, Leader, or Dictator; the highest officer was the Shanghai banker, Mr. Wang K'ê-min, Chairman of the Executive Division (literally, _yüan_, but not in the Nationalist sense). The scope, succession and competence of this Provisional Government were as much in doubt as its origin. Under the Provisional Government there flowered a new political philosophy, the _Hsin Min Chu I_ ("Principles of the Renewed People," "People-Renewing Principles," or "Principles of the New People"). The similarity of this principle to the _San Min Chu I_ is striking, but is no more than verbal. Propaganda under this credo resembled the Japanese-prepared state-philosophy of _Wang Tao_, the _kingly_ (as opposed to tyrannous and unnatural) _way_ of the Confucian canon, which--revered throughout the Far East, even by Sun Yat-sen--had been slanted to suit Manchoukuo through a Concordia Society (_Hsieh-ho-hui_). Each of the Sunyatsenist principles was refuted in detail, Pan-Asian racialism was encouraged, a class-war _between_ the nations was emphasized, and conservatism in thought, manners, and morals recommended. The Peking propaganda machinery was well-financed; the _Hsin-min-hui_ became the only tolerated political group. This _hui_ was headed by Mr. Miao Ping, a Kuomintang Party veteran whose political-bureau experience dated back to the days of Borodin. His renegation, never publicly explained, enabled Japan to issue a careful parody of the _San Min Chu I_. His assistant was a Japanese. Business associations, student groups, and educational administration were fitted into the pattern. The principles were not logically or systematically developed, but the key terms sufficed to coordinate opportunist appeals justifying the invasion, and opposing resistance, guerrillas, modernizations, and democracy. The _Hsin Min Chu I_ received no credence through conversion, faith, or loyalty. Operating on sound advertising principles, however, they served well even if they failed to command obedience but did unsettle allegiance to the other side, and ubiquitous iteration muddied thought.