‘I answer, therefore, with the theologians, that the killing of a tyrant is not homicide, inasmuch as it is just and legal. According to the general law, I confess it would be homicide; but if there be shewn justifiable cause for it, no punishment, but remuneration, should follow. ‘With regard to that part of the argument which says, ‘Quod hominem homini insidiari nefas est, et quæ magis insidiatur homini,’ &c. it alludes to a tyrant who is continually practising the death of his king and sovereign lord. ‘Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas.’ As for him who slays a man, by watching a proper opportunity for it, to save the life of his king, and preserve him from mortal peril, he does no ‘nefas,’ but acquits himself of his duty toward his sovereign lord. ‘Et homo est nefas, et perditio, et iniquitas;’ and therefore he who kills such an one, by watching a proper opportunity, does it to save the life of his king. ‘In regard to that passage which says, ‘Non facias aliis, &c. alterum non lædere,’ &c. I reply, that it makes against the tyrant, and in favour of him who slays him; for he (the tyrant) does against his king that which he would not have to be done against himself, ‘et ipsum regem injuriatur et lædit.’ For which reason, he who has put to death such a person, according to his deserts, has done nothing contrary to the laws, but has preserved the meaning of them, namely, true equity and loyalty towards his king and sovereign lord. ‘To the other quotation from the laws that says, ‘Hominem occidere, capitale esse omnis usus armorum,’ &c. I answer, that there are no laws nor usages so very general but that there may be some exceptions made from them. I say, that the case of killing a tyrant is exempted, more especially when he is guilty of the crimes before mentioned. How can any greater cause of exemption be shewn than that, when the murder is done through necessity, to save the king from being put to death? ‘Even when conspiracies against his royal person have been so far carried by witchcraft and otherwise, that he is disabled from administering justice; and the tyrant being found deserving of that punishment, the king, from weakness of intellect, cannot, or will not, punish him, the killing of him, in such cases, is not against the law, properly speaking, for all laws have two meanings: the first is the textual signification, the other is the ‘quo animo,’—the person committing a crime has done it, and the law, as intended by those who made it, is to be explained according to the intent of its framers, and not always according to the literal sense.