‘I thus prove my proposition. He who is related to the king has an interest to guard his honour and life against every injurious attempt, and is bounden so to do more than any stranger, and, in like manner, descending from those of high rank to the common subject. Should he fail in this his duty, the more deserving is he of punishment, while, on the contrary, by performing it, he gains the greater honour and renown. ‘Item in hoc magis relucent amor et obedientia occisoris, vel occidere præcipientis ad principem et dominum suum quia est magis honorabile si fuerit præpotens dux vel comes. Item in hoc magis relucet potentia regis quod est honorabile et quanto occisor vel dictæ occisionis præceptor non fuerit vilior et potentior tanto magis,’ &c. ‘In regard to alliances, oaths, promises and confederations, made between one knight and another, in whatever manner they be, should they be intended to the prejudice of the prince or his children, or the public welfare, no one is bound to keep them; for, in so doing, he would act contrary to the laws, moral, natural and divine. I shall now prove the truth of this: ‘Arguendo sic. Bonam æquitatem (dictamen rectaæ rationis) et legem divinam boni principes in persona publica servare, et utilitatem reipublicæ debent præferre, et præsupponere in omnibus talibus promissionibus, juramentis, et confederationibus: immo excipiuntur implicite secundum dictamen rectæ rationis: bonam æquitatem et charitatis ordinem quia alias esset licitum non obedire principi immo rebellare contra principes, quod est expresse contra sacram Scripturam quæ sic dicit: ‘Obedite principibus vestris, licet etiam discolis et alibi. Subjecti estote regi præcellenti, sive judicibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum.’ 1 Pet. iij. ut sup. allegatum est. ‘‘Ex illo arguitur sic. Quandocunque occurunt duæ obligationes ad invicem contrariæ major tenenda est, et minor dissolvenda quantum adhoc, sed in casu nostro concurrunt duæ obligationes. Et cum obligatio ad principem sit major, et alia minor obligatio ad principem tenenda est, et alia non in tali casu. Item arguendo eandem quæstionem, quandocunque aliquis facit quod est melius quamvis juravit se id non facturum, non est perjurium, sed perjurio contrarium: ut expresse ponit magister sententiarum ultima dicti tertii: sed in casu nostro melius est tyrannum in præfato casu occidere quamvis juravit se non occisurum quam presentem vivere ut tactum est superius: ergo occidere tyrannum in præfato casu quamvis juravit se non occisurum, non perjurium facit, sed perjurio contrarium. Et consequenter Isidorus in libro de summo bono sic dicit: id non est observandum sacramentum et juramentum quo malum incaute remititur, sed in casu nostro male et incaute promititur. Sed non tenent promissiones jurata vel confæderationes contra principem, uxorem principis, liberos, vel reipublicæ utilitatem.’