‘I say, therefore, that such ought to be the judgment given for them, and without delay, considering the notoriety and enormity of the offence of our adversary; for it is publicly known, that the duke of Burgundy has confessed himself guilty of it. He first made a confession of his guilt to my lord of Berry and to the king of Sicily, giving no reason for it but that he was urged on by the devil: he then did the same before several noblemen. This ought therefore to weigh against him, and convict him of the crime, without further trial: nor ought you to suffer any sort of colouring to be admitted in palliation of his guilt. He ought not to be heard otherwise than he has been, for he varied not in his confessions to the different persons; and pope Innocent approves of this, in his chapter on Free Will, and Guillermus de Montleon, in his chapter on Clerical Constitutions. Pope Nicholas held king Lothaire, in like manner, convicted to his prejudice in a certain case, about which he had written to the pope, as appears in the above chapter. This confession of king Lothaire had been made in a letter, previously to any trial. The duke of Burgundy, therefore, ought to be condemned from this public confession of his crime in the presence of different persons. He has beside made a similar confession when he appeared publicly before thee, lord of Acquitaine, when thou didst sit in judgment representing the person of the king, and before the princes of the blood and all the council of state. He cannot, therefore, deny his having made such confession before competent judges. It follows then, that no further trial is necessary, but that sentence should immediately be passed; for confession of guilt should be judged the fullest evidence. ‘The law says, ‘In confitentem nullæ sunt partes judicantis.’ And supposing, that according to some, a sentence is requisite, at least it is certain that no trial or examination of the cause is necessary, since this present case is extremely notorious. So has it formerly been determined by the sentence and judgment of the kings in times past, against several great lords of their day,--to wit, that when the facts were notorious, no other process or inquisition was required. And so shall it be determined, by the grace of God, in the present case,--for so reason demands. ‘Should it, however, be thought necessary to go into another trial, which, from all I have said, I cannot suppose, my lady of Orleans is ready prepared to bring forward the fullest proof of what I have advanced, and such as must convince all reasonable persons. But as my lady can now only offer civil conclusions, and would willingly propose criminal ones, but that it belongs to the king’s attorney-general according to the usage in France,--my lady, therefore, most earnestly supplicates the king’s attorney to join with her, and propose such sentence as the law in this case requires.’