The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce, Volume 09: Tangential ViewsBierce, Ambrose
General
The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce, Volume 09: Tangential Views
Bierce, Ambrose
American essays; American literature
THE VALUE OF TRUTH
The Texas Legislature once considered a bill that was of some
importance to liars. It provided that if a man called another a liar
and the latter disclosed his sense of the situation by “putting a
head on” the former, the State would hold him guiltless of offense.
Texan public opinion naturally viewed it with alarm as an attempt
to introduce alien and doubtful customs by substitution of the fist
for the bowie-knife. It appears, though, that several States of the
Union have laws against calling one a liar. In Virginia, Kentucky and
Arkansas, it is a misdemeanor punishable by fine. In Mississippi, South
Carolina and West Virginia it is ground for civil action for damages.
Georgia makes it a felony if it is untrue. In none of these states,
apparently, and nowhere else, is it either a misdemeanor or a felony to
_be_ a liar. That seems rather queer, does it not? I wonder why it
is so.
Now that I think of it, I seem always to have observed (and possibly
the phenomenon has not been overlooked by all others) that the man whom
the word “liar” maddens to crime is commonly not maddened to anything
in particular by the consciousness of being one.
The philosophy of the matter is that truthfulness, like all the other
virtues, takes rank as such because in the long run, and in the greater
number of instances, it is expedient. Whatever is, generally speaking,
expedient, that is to say, conducive to the welfare of the race, comes
to be considered a virtue; whatever, with only the same limitations,
does not promote, but obstructs, the welfare of the race is held to be
a sin. Morality has, and can have, no other basis than expediency. A
virtue is not an end; it is a means; the end is that only conceivable
welfare, happiness. To increase the sum of happiness—that is the only
worthy ambition, the only creditable motive. Whatever does that is
right; whatever does the contrary is wrong. An act that does neither
the one nor the other has no moral character at all. That an act can
be right or wrong without regard to its consequences is to a sane
understanding an unthinkable proposition. It is difficult to imagine a
world in which happiness would commonly be promoted by falsehood, but
in such a world falsehood would indubitably be considered, and rightly
considered, a virtue, and to be called a truth-teller would be resented
as an insult, especially by those most irreclaimably addicted to the
habit.
During a recent trial of a postal-service “grafter” a witness confessed
with candor that one of his commercial habits was that of saying “the
thing that is not.” “You can’t help telling lies in business,” he
explained. But you can; you can tell the truth for the good of your
soul and make an assignment for the benefit of your creditors.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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