‘TOOKE. This word will give us no trouble. Like the other words, _true_ is also a past participle of the Saxon verb _treowan_, confidere, to think, to believe firmly, to be thoroughly persuaded of, to trow. _True_, as we now write it, or _trew_, as it was formerly written, means simply and merely that which is trowed, and instead of its being a rare commodity upon earth, except only in words, there is nothing but truth in the world. ‘That every man, in his communication with others, should speak that which he troweth, is of so great importance to mankind, that it ought not to surprise us, if we find the most extravagant and exaggerated praises bestowed upon truth. But truth supposes mankind; for whom and by whom alone the word is formed, and to whom only it is applicable. If no man, no truth. There is therefore no such thing as eternal, immutable, everlasting truth; unless mankind, such as they are at present, be also eternal, immutable, and everlasting. Two persons may contradict each other, and yet both speak truth. For the truth of one person may be opposite to the truth of another. To speak truth may be a vice as well as a virtue; for there are many occasions when it ought not to be spoken. If you reject my explanation, find out if you can some other possible meaning of the word, or content yourself with Johnson, by saying that _true_ is not false, and _false_ is—not true. For so he explains the words.’—Vol. ii. p. 407. In a note the author adds, ‘Mr. Locke, in the second book of his Essay, chapter xxxii., treats of _true_ and _false_ ideas, and is much distressed throughout the whole chapter, because he had not in his mind any determinate meaning of the word _true_. If that excellent man had himself followed the advice which he gave to his disputing friends concerning the word _liquor_; if he had followed his own rule, previously to writing about _true_ and _false_ ideas, and had determined what meaning he applied to _true_, _being_, _thing_, _real_, _right_, _wrong_, he could not have written the above chapter, which exceedingly distresses the reader, who searches for a meaning where there is none to be found.’ Whether Mr. Locke would have been satisfied with Mr. Tooke’s account of these words, I cannot say. I know that I am not. I do not think it the true one. It is therefore not the true one. Mr. Tooke thinks it is, and therefore it is the true one. Which of us is right? That what a man thinks, he thinks, and that if he speaks what he thinks, he speaks truth in one principal sense of the word, is what does not require much illustration; but whether what he thinks is true or false, whether his opinion is right or wrong, or whether there is not another possible and actual meaning of the terms besides that given by Mr. Tooke, is the old difficulty, which remains just where it was before, in spite of etymology.