Sir Francis says, ‘Something of this sort I can easily perceive, but not to the extent you carry it. I see that those sham deities, Fate and Destiny, aliquid _fatum_, quelque chose _destinée_, are merely the past participles of _fari_ and _destiner_. That Chance (“high arbiter,” as Milton calls him) and his twin-brother Accident are merely the participles of _escheoir_, _cheoir_, and _cadere_. And that to say, it befell me by chance or by accident, is absurdly saying it befell me by falling. ‘I agree with you, that Providence, Prudence, Innocence, Substance, and all the rest of that tribe of qualities (in _ence_ and _ance_) are merely the neuter plurals of the present participles of _ordere_, _nocere_, _stare_, &c. &c. That Angel, Saint, Spirit, are the past participles αγγελλειυ, sanciri, spirare. That the Italian _cucolo_, a cuckoo, gives us the verb to cucol, and its past participle cuckold.’ And what if it does: will Mr. Tooke therefore pretend to say that there is no such thing? This is indeed turning etymology to a good account. It is clearing off old scores with a vengeance, and establishing morality on an entirely new basis. For my own part, I can only say of the whole of the reasoning of this author, with Voltaire’s Candide, ‘_la tête me tourne: on ne sait ou l’on est_.’ Whether any or all of those metaphysical beings enumerated by Mr. Tooke do or do not exist, what their nature or qualities are, whether modes, relatives, substances, I shall not here undertake to determine, but I do conceive that none of these questions can be resolved in any way by inquiring whether the names denoting them are not the past participles of certain verbs. A shorter method would I think be to say at once that all metaphysical and moral terms, whether participles or not, are but names, that names are not things, and that therefore the things themselves have no existence. It is upon this philosophical principle that the heroical Jonathan Wild proceeds in his definition of the word Honour, for after losing himself to no purpose in the common metaphysical jargon on the subject, and in moral causes and qualities, he comes at last to this clear and unembarrassed conclusion,—‘That honour consists in the word _honour_, and nothing else.’ I will only give one instance more of this reformed system of logic and metaphysics. ‘BURDETT. I still wish for an explanation of one word more: which on account of its extreme importance ought not to be omitted. What is Truth? You know when Pilate had asked the same question, he went out and would not stay for an answer, and from that time to this no answer has been given. And from that time to this mankind have been wrangling and tearing each other to pieces for the truth, without once considering the meaning of the word.’