And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himself, and not know when he hath done: much less will he be able to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations of arithmetic. So that without words there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers; much less of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the reckoning whereof is necessary to the being, or well-being of mankind.’—_Leviathan_, chap. iv., pp. 12, 14. The same train of reasoning occurs in the ‘Discourse of Human Nature,’ with some variation in the expression. ‘By the advantage of names it is that we are capable of science, which beasts for want of them are not; nor man, without the use of them; for as a beast misseth not one or two out of her many young ones, for want of those names of order, _one_, _two_, and _three_, and which we call _number_; so neither would a man without repeating orally or mentally those words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him. Seeing there be many conceptions of one and the same thing, and that for every conception we give it a several name, it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of _just_, _valiant_, _strong_, _comely_, &c. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellations: as to all things we _see_ we give the name of _visible_. Those names we give to many, are called universal to them all: as the name of _man_ to every particular of mankind. Such appellations as we give to one only thing, we call individual, or singular; as _Socrates_ and other proper names, or by circumlocution, _He that writ the Iliads_, for _Homer_.