The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
‘For the seventh point, which is, that all events have necessary causes,
it is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, let us
in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing
(for example) “ames ace” upon a pair of dice, and see if it must not
have been necessary before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it
had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it,
consisting partly in the dice, partly in outward things, as the posture
of the parts of the hand, the measure of force applied by the caster,
the posture of the parts of the table, and the like. In sum, there was
nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that
particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for
if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the
throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like
manner it may be proved that every other accident, how contingent soever
it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily. The
same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for
example, of the weather: ’tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or
not rain. If, therefore, it be not necessary it shall rain, it is
necessary it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the
proposition, it shall rain or not rain, should be true. I know there be
some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come
to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain,
which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of
them is necessary; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they
make a distinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but
_indeterminate_, which distinction either signifies no more but this,
one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity
remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be
not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of
them is true _titirice_, but neither of them, _tu patulice_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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