100/1 Disc. 123, pr.; 124, Sections 2, 3. As to the historical origin of the latter rule, compare Lecture V. 101/1 Lecture I, pp. 3, 4. 101/2 Lib. I. c. 2, ad. fin. 101/3 Fol. 155. 101/4 Bro. Trespass, pl. 119; Finch, 198; 3 Bl. Comm. 118, 119. 101/5 See Brunner, Schwurgerichte, p. 171. 101/6 An example of the year 1195 will be found in Mr. Bigelow's very interesting and valuable Placita Anglo-Normanica, p. 285, citing Rot. Cur. Regis, 38; S.C. ? Abbr. Plac., fol. 2, Ebor. rot. 5. The suit was by way of appeal; the cause of action, a felonious trespass. Cf. Bract., fol. 144 a. 102/1 An example may be seen in the Year Book, 30 & 31 Edward I. (Horwood), p. 106. 103/1 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18. 103/2 Popham, 151; Latch, 13, 119, A.D. 1605. 104/1 Hobart, 134, A.D. 1616. 104/2 3 East, 593. 105/1 1 Bing. 213, A.D. 1823. 105/2 6 Cush. 292. 106/1 Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 84 et seq., A.D. 1864. 106/2 Nitro-glycerine Case (Parrot v. Wells), 15 Wall. 524, 538. 106/3 Hill & Denio, (Lalor,) 193; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 489. 107/1 Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62. See, further, Clayton, 22, pl. 38; Holt, C.J., in Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149; Lord Hardwicke, in Williams v. Jones, Cas. temp. Hardw. 298; Hall v. Fearnley, 8 Q.B. 919; Martin, B., in Coward v. Baddeley, 4 H.&N. 478; Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442. 107/2 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, 784; Smith v. London & South-Western Ry. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98, 102. Compare Campbell, Negligence, Section 1 (2d ed.), for Austin's point of view. 109/1 cf. Bro. Corone, pl. 6; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 442; D. 9. 2. 5, Section 2; D. 48. 8. 12. 113/1 I Thorpe, p. 85; cf. LL. Hen. I., c. 88, Section 3. 113/2 Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176. 114/1 See 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 43 Edw. III. 33, pl. 38. The plea in the latter case was that the defendant performed the cure as well as he knew how, without this that the horse died for default of his care. The inducement, at least, of this plea seems to deal with negligence as meaning the actual state of the party's mind. 115/1 Hobart, 134. 115/2 See Knight v. Jermin, Cro. Eliz. 134; Chambers v. Taylor, Cro. Eliz. 900. 115/3 32 Conn. 75, 89, 90. 116/1 Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII. 2 b, Pl. 2. 116/2 Keilway, 46 b. 116/3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339; L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-282; 4 H.&C. 263; 3 id. 774. 117/1 See Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 633, 634. 117/2 See Lecture I. p. 23 and n. 3. 117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136; S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245. 118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.