118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11, pl. 10. 118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled. 118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. 118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co. Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; S.C., 3 Salk. 169; S.C., nom. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Strange, 264; May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101; Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622. 119/1 12 Mod. 335. See Andrew Baker's case, 1 Hale, P.C. 430. 119/2 Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.&F. 92. 119/3 See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 281, 282; Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 441; Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245, 260; Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. N.S. 722; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 10; 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 10; 13 Hen. VII. 15, pl. 10; Keilway, 3 b, pl. 7. Cf. 4 Kent (12th ed.), 110, n. 1, ad fin. 120/1 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 13 Am. L.R. 609. 120/2 See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 612, 614. 120/3 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383. 121/1 L.R. 1 C.P. 300. 121/2 See Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 239, bottom. 121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487. 122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107; Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149. 123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 120. 123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p. 488. 124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197. 125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759. 125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722. 125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594. 127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873. 128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401. 128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567. 128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557. 128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465. 128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20 Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165. 135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446. 136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, 243. 138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.