The Communist Threat in the Taiwan AreaEisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David)
History
The Communist Threat in the Taiwan Area
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David)
China -- Foreign relations -- United States; Taiwan -- Defenses; United States -- Foreign relations -- China
If that is their decision, then a western Pacific Munich would not buy
us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It would
dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches anything,
appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to fight a
major war.
Congress has made clear its recognition that the security of the
western Pacific is vital to the security of the United States and that
we should be firm. The Senate has ratified, by overwhelming vote,
security treaties with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the
Pescadores, and also the Republic of Korea. We have a mutual security
treaty with the Republic of the Philippines, which could be next in
line for conquest if Formosa fell into hostile hands. These treaties
commit the United States to the defense of the treaty areas. In
addition, there is a joint resolution which the Congress passed in
January 1955 dealing specifically with Formosa and the offshore
islands of Free China in the Formosa Straits.
At that time the situation was similar to what it is today.
Congress then voted the President authority to employ the Armed Forces
of the United States for the defense not only of Formosa but of
related positions, such as Quemoy and Matsu, if I believed their
defense to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.
I might add that the mandate from the Congress was given by an almost
unanimous bipartisan vote.
Today, the Chinese Communists announce, repeatedly and officially,
that their military operations against Quemoy are preliminary to
attack on Formosa. So it is clear that the Formosa Straits resolution
of 1955 applies to the present situation.
If the present bombardment and harassment of Quemoy should be
converted into a major assault, with which the local defenders could
not cope, then we would be compelled to face precisely the situation
that Congress visualized in 1955.
I have repeatedly sought to make clear our position in this matter so
that there would not be danger of Communist miscalculation. The
Secretary of State on September 4th made a statement to the same end.
This statement could not, of course, cover every contingency. Indeed,
I interpret the joint resolution as requiring me not to make absolute
advance commitments but to use my judgment according to the
circumstances of the time. But the statement did carry a clear meaning
to the Chinese Communists and to the Soviet Union. There will be no
retreat in the face of armed aggression, which is part and parcel of a
continuing program of using armed force to conquer new regions.
I do not believe that the United States can be either lured or
frightened into appeasement. I believe that, in taking the position of
opposing aggression by force, I am taking the only position which is
consistent with the vital interests of the United States and, indeed,
with the peace of the world.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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