Secondly--and this is the metaphysical reason--it cannot do so
because our physical body is itself only a part of that objective
universe of sense-impressions which the soul is conscious of as
essentially distinct from its own inmost identity.
Metaphysical idealism seems to hold that the ultimate monad of
self-consciousness is not this personal micro-cosmic monad which
I am conscious of as the empirical self or "soul" but an impersonal
macrocosmic monad or "unity of apperception" which underlies
the whole field of impressions and is unable, by reason of its
inherent nature, to contemplate itself as an "object" at all.
What the complex vision seems to me to disclose, is a revelation
which includes at one and the same moment "the universal
monad" and the "personal monad"; but it indicates clearly enough
that the former is an abstraction from the latter. My thought can
certainly think of the whole universe, including time and space, as
one enormous mass of impressions or ideals presenting itself
inside the circle of my mind.
Of this mass of impressions, including time and space, my
thought, thus abstracted from my personal soul, becomes the
circumference. Outside my thought there is nothing at all. Inside
my thought there is all that is. The metaphysical reason insists that
this all-comprehensive thought or all-embracing consciousness
cannot contemplate itself as an object but is compelled to remain
an universal subject whose object can only be the mass of
impressions which it contains.
If it is possible to speak of this "a priori" background of all
possible perception as a "monad" at all, it is a monad which
certainly lacks the essential power of the individual monad which
we know as our real self, for this latter can and does contemplate
itself as an object.
But as I have hinted before, the complex vision's attribute of
self-consciousness projects a second abstraction, which takes its place
between this ultimate monad which is pure "subject" and our real
personal self which is so much more than subject and object
together.
This second abstraction, "thrown off" by our pure self-consciousness
just as the first one is "thrown off" by our pure reason,
becomes therefore an intervening monad which exists midway
between the monad which is pure "subject"--if that can be
called a monad at all--and the actual individual soul which is the
living reality of both these thought-projections.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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