Retracing once more our steps over this perilous bridge of ultimate
thought, we may thus indicate the situation. Our starting-point
cannot be the "a priori synthetic unity of apperception," because
this is an abstraction of the pure reason, and if accepted as a real
fact would contradict and negate all the other attributes of the soul.
Our starting-point cannot be the universal "monad" of
self-consciousness, because this is an abstraction of the "I am I" and
if accepted as a real fact would negate and suppress every attribute
of the soul except the attributes of self-consciousness and emotion.
Our starting-point cannot be the objective world, considered in its
evolutionary externality, because this external world depends for
its very existence upon the attributes of the soul, especially upon
the attribute of sensation.
Our starting-point can therefore be nothing less than the complex
vision, which on the one hand implies the reality of the soul and
on the other the reality of the external world, and which itself is
the vision of a real concrete personality. The individual is thus
disclosed as something more than the universal, the microcosm as
something more than the macrocosm, and any living personality as
something more than any conceivable absolute being.
By an original act of faith, towards which we are helped by the
soul's attribute of imagination, we are compelled to conceive of
every other soul in the world as being the centre of a universe
more or less identical in character with the universe of which our
own soul is the centre. These separate universes we have to
conceive as being subjective impressions of the same objective
reality, the beauty, truth, and goodness of which are guaranteed for
us by those "invisible companions of men" in whose eternal vision
they find their synthesis.
The tragedy of our life consists in the fact that it is only in rare
exalted moments, when the rhythmic harmony of the complex
vision is most intense and yet most calm, that the individual soul
feels the presence of those supreme companions whose real and
personal existence I have attempted to indicate. These ideal and
yet most real companions of humanity make their presence felt by
the soul in just the same immediate, direct and equivocal way in
which we feel the influence of a friend or lover whose spirit, in his
bodily absence, is concentrated upon our spirit, even as ours is
upon his.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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