The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919Whitehead, Alfred North
Philosophy
The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919
Whitehead, Alfred North
Knowledge, Theory of; Nature; Science -- Philosophy
Let me summarise the previously stated objections to this theory of
nature. In the first place it seeks for the cause of the knowledge of
the thing known instead of seeking for the character of the thing known:
secondly it assumes a knowledge of time in itself apart from events
related in time: thirdly it assumes a knowledge of space in itself apart
from events related in space. There are in addition to these objections
other flaws in the theory.
Some light is thrown on the artificial status of causal nature in this
theory by asking, why causal nature is presumed to occupy time and
space. This really raises the fundamental question as to what
characteristics causal nature should have in common with apparent
nature. Why--on this theory--should the cause which influences the mind
to perception have any characteristics in common with the effluent
apparent nature? In particular, why should it be in space? Why should it
be in time? And more generally, What do we know about mind which would
allow us to infer any particular characteristics of a cause which should
influence mind to particular effects?
The transcendence of time beyond nature gives some slight reason for
presuming that causal nature should occupy time. For if the mind
occupies periods of time, there would seem to be some vague reason for
assuming that influencing causes occupy the same periods of time, or at
least, occupy periods which are strictly related to the mental periods.
But if the mind does not occupy volumes of space, there seems to be no
reason why causal nature should occupy any volumes of space. Thus space
would seem to be merely apparent in the same sense as apparent nature is
merely apparent. Accordingly if science is really investigating causes
which operate on the mind, it would seem to be entirely on the wrong
tack in presuming that the causes which it is seeking for have spatial
relations. Furthermore there is nothing else in our knowledge analogous
to these causes which influence the mind to perception. Accordingly,
beyond the rashly presumed fact that they occupy time, there is really
no ground by which we can determine any point of their character. They
must remain for ever unknown.
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