The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919Whitehead, Alfred North
Philosophy
The Concept of Nature: The Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919
Whitehead, Alfred North
Knowledge, Theory of; Nature; Science -- Philosophy
VI CONGRUENCE 120
VII OBJECTS 143
VIII SUMMARY 164
IX THE ULTIMATE PHYSICAL CONCEPTS 185
NOTE: ON THE GREEK CONCEPT OF A POINT 197
NOTE: ON SIGNIFICANCE AND INFINITE EVENTS 197
INDEX 199
THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
CHAPTER I
NATURE AND THOUGHT
The subject-matter of the Tarner lectures is defined by the founder to
be 'the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Relations or Want of
Relations between the different Departments of Knowledge.' It is fitting
at the first lecture of this new foundation to dwell for a few moments
on the intentions of the donor as expressed in this definition; and I do
so the more willingly as I shall thereby be enabled to introduce the
topics to which the present course is to be devoted.
We are justified, I think, in taking the second clause of the definition
as in part explanatory of the earlier clause. What is the philosophy of
the sciences? It is not a bad answer to say that it is the study of the
relations between the different departments of knowledge. Then with
admirable solicitude for the freedom of learning there is inserted in
the definition after the word 'relations' the phrase 'or want of
relations.' A disproof of relations between sciences would in itself
constitute a philosophy of the sciences. But we could not dispense
either with the earlier or the later clause. It is not every relation
between sciences which enters into their philosophy. For example biology
and physics are connected by the use of the microscope. Still, I may
safely assert that a technical description of the uses of the microscope
in biology is not part of the philosophy of the sciences. Again, you
cannot abandon the later clause of the definition; namely that
referring to the relations between the sciences, without abandoning the
explicit reference to an ideal in the absence of which philosophy must
languish from lack of intrinsic interest. That ideal is the attainment
of some unifying concept which will set in assigned relationships within
itself all that there is for knowledge, for feeling, and for emotion.
That far off ideal is the motive power of philosophic research; and
claims allegiance even as you expel it. The philosophic pluralist is a
strict logician; the Hegelian thrives on contradictions by the help of
his absolute; the Mohammedan divine bows before the creative will of
Allah; and the pragmatist will swallow anything so long as it 'works.'
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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