At the time of the intervention in Cuba the United States was only too eager to absolutely pledge herself to establish the independence for which the unhappy Cubans had been fighting. This unqualified promise was given readily and sincerely. No doubt it was made to remove the apprehension of conservative Americans as well as Cubans. But conditions had changed in 1901. Then the possession of Porto Rico, of Guam and the Philippines was more than certain. Certainly there was more to be said in favor of retaining Cuba than for annexing those far-flung possessions in the Pacific. But to annex Cuba was virtually impossible,—a definite pledge to recognize her independence made in the hectic days of ’98 barred the way. And so under Roosevelt’s administration America kept her word and withdrew from Cuba. But she kept her word with a very important qualification in the Platt Amendment, which virtually meant no Cuban independence after all. Already commercial advantage was overcoming conscience and principle. The United States had promised to quit Cuba when “pacification was accomplished.” Here was an elastic condition which could be interpreted narrowly. She could under that phrase have stayed on the island indefinitely troubled only by the never-ending contest between good faith and pecuniary interest. Instead America chose to protect herself by means of the Platt Amendment which briefly provided that (1) Cuba should not enter into any agreement with foreign powers which might tend to impair her independence; (2) that no debt should be contracted which could not be paid out of the island’s current revenues; (3) that the United States might intervene to preserve Cuban independence, enforce the treaty obligations imposed by the treaty of Paris, and insure a government able to protect property and life; (4) that all acts performed by the American government during its brief occupation were to be validated; (5) that Cuba was to sell or lease to the United States sites for two naval stations; (6) and that by way of further assurance that these provisions were to be followed strictly _Cuba should embody them all in a treaty_ with the United States. The strictness and exactness of these provisions will more clearly appear on a careful reading of the amendment itself, paragraphs (1) and (3) in particular being the most exact. These provisions meant that the United States virtually retained complete control of Cuba’s foreign relations. The right was also reserved to her whereby she might intervene in the island government in order to correct any conditions which _in her judgment_ were considered unsatisfactory. The two naval bases which she reserved for herself on opposite sides of the island were the best evidence of her power to exercise such absolute control.