It is timely therefore to inquire whether American Constitutional Law today affords the Court a dependable weapon with which to combat effectively contemporary enlarged conceptions of presidential power. Pertinent in this connection is the aforementioned recent action of the Court in Youngstown _v._ Sawyer disallowing presidential seizure of the steel industry. The net result of that Case is distinctly favorable to presidential pretensions, in two respects: First, because of the failure of the Court to traverse the President's finding of facts allegedly justifying his action, an omission in accord with the doctrine of Political Questions; secondly, the evident endorsement by a majority of the Court of the doctrine that, as stated in Justice Clark's opinion: "The Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency".[57] That the Court would have sustained, as against the President's action, a clear-cut manifestation of congressional action to the contrary is, on the other hand, unquestionable. In short, if we are today looking for a check upon the development of executive emergency government, our best reliance is upon the powers of Congress, which can always supply needed gaps in its legislation. The Court can only say "no", and there is no guarantee that in the public interest it would wish to assume this responsibility. IV The Concept of Substantive Due Process of Law A cursory examination of the pages of this volume reveals that fully a quarter of them deal with cases in which the Court has been asked to protect private interests of one kind or another against legislation, most generally state legislation, which is alleged to invade "liberty" or "property" contrary to "due process of law". How is this vast proliferation of cases, and attendant expansion of the Court's constitutional jurisdiction, to be explained? The explanation, in brief, is to be found in the replacement of the original meaning of the due process clause with a meaning of vastly greater scope. Judicial review is always a function, so to speak, of the viable Constitutional Law of a particular period. From what has been previously said in this Introduction, it clearly appears that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution has involved throughout considerable lawmaking, but in no other instance has its lawmaking been more evident than in its interpretation of the due process clauses, and in no other instance have the state judiciaries contributed so much to the final result. The modern concept of substantive due process is not the achievement of any one American high court; it is the joint achievement of several--in the end, of all.[58]