The words “per legem terræ” have been taken by some not to refer to jury trial. Attempts have been made to justify illegal proceedings by this interpretation. This has given rise to arguments and enactments, by means of which the relation of these words to jury trial has been settled beyond dispute; and it is these arguments and enactments which as much as anything else have thrown light on the ancient institution of jury trial, and have confirmed as a lasting and inalienable part of the Constitution, this ancient “law of the land.” One of the most marked discussions on this subject, ending with the establishment of the principle which we have laid down, that jury trial is the one constitutional form of trial recognised in Magna Charta, took place in the reign of Charles I., when Judge Selden, at the time of the arrest of the five members, made a famous speech, pleading for the release of Sir E. Hampden from illegal imprisonment, on the ground that these words “per legem terræ,” showed that it was illegal to imprison him by any other method than that of jury trial. There were also several Statutes passed in the reign of Edward II. and III., distinctly interpreting these words to mean, by the old law of England, viz., by jury trial.[19] I refer to these arguments regarding this expression “per legem terræ,” not, as will be evident to my readers, because of the insufficiency of the words which precede them, “the judgment of his peers,” which in themselves are sufficient to establish and guard the principle of jury trial, but because of the danger which has arisen, and might arise again, of the attempt to substitute in place of jury trial a modern enactment calling itself the law of the land. And if one thing more than another were required to confirm the assertion that Acts of Parliament, which are destructive of jury trial, are by no means included in the words “per legem terræ,” we find that confirmation in a passage by Lord Coke, which not only substantiates what I have said, but also strongly, and almost prophetically, confirms the soundness of the grounds of our opposition to the particular Acts in question.