Sir Edward Creasy also says on the same subject:—“The great constitutional principle of trial by jury is still respected so far as regards all trials for offences of a graver character, and which subject the person convicted of them to a severe punishment.... But for upwards of a century the practice of exposing persons charged with minor offences to trial and summary conviction by one or two justices of the peace has been growing more and more prevalent. It is deeply to be regretted that so little heed has been paid to the sage and humane warnings of Blackstone against the increase of this system of withdrawing criminal charges from the consideration of a jury.” Mr. Justice Warren also speaks, in his abridgment and adaptation of Blackstone’s _Commentaries_, respecting the “inroads on the noble institution of trial by jury which are now being made incessantly;” and he gives the following warning: “It is a matter of supreme concern to the country to beware of shaking the confidence of the humble classes of society in the administration of criminal justice, by infringing their right to an open and formal trial by their equals, and placing them at the mercy of, it may be, an interested and prejudiced superior.”[41] While merely noticing in passing the grave objections of these eminent lawyers to the whole principle and operation of these summary convictions, I must draw the particular attention of my readers to the only excuse which these lawyers allow for this encroachment on constitutional rights, namely, the beneficent intention of expediting justice in minor cases for the sake of the individuals concerned. From the quotations which I have given above, there are three main facts which may be gathered, viz., _first_, that summary proceedings _are_ an encroachment on liberty, and lamented over by great lawyers; _second_, that they are only for the sake of minor offences, and only in that case tolerable; and _third_, that there are cases which, when included in this category, render these encroachments especially dangerous, and by no manner of means, or by any argument, to be tolerated. Let the reader observe carefully these facts, and let him also observe the reason why these summary convictions are allowed in minor cases—that is, for the sake of the accused, and to expedite justice,—and let him ask himself whether he finds this motive inspiring these Acts. The answer to his inquiry will be, that the summary proceedings under these Acts are _not_ for the sake of the accused, and that they are _not_ to expedite justice. If then for these intentions the danger is tolerated of the infringement of the strict letter of Magna Charta in these minor cases, can its principle therefore be permitted to be destroyed in a case where no such intentions are manifest?