though no such representation were made, and though every woman had direct access to the Act of Parliament thus falsely interpreted to her, it must still be apparent to every honest mind that it is a gross parody of justice to offer to any person an insufficient or partial tribunal on the one hand, and, on the other, the opportunity of self-crimination. It is a base and unjust alternative, and one which ought not to be presented to any citizen of a free country, and, above all, ought not to be presented in this particular case; for, be it observed, such an alternative and such a method of trial gives rise to a recklessness of accusation peculiarly grievous in the present instance, and which the system in question seems framed precisely to foster,—a recklessness of accusation which would be checked by the fear which must affect even the most powerful individual in the State, and make him reflect well before he too lightly brings any accusation against any one, knowing that the truth of that accusation must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of trial, and not by those paid officials accustomed to believe in the truth of such accusations, and knowing that when once the fact of a false accusation is ascertained the law must of course redress it. Let me, however, at this point remind the reader, that my argument throughout is not a plea to retain these Acts, amended by the introduction of the safeguard of jury trial; but that my object is to bring them to the test of this ancient and sacred institution, and to show that since they cannot exist in conjunction with it, then these Acts stand condemned thereby, and therefore must be expunged from the statute-book. The question now arises, Is this at all a fit case for summary proceeding, even although those proceedings did in this case expedite the celerity of justice? Now, if we refer back to the quotations already made on this subject from Blackstone and others, we shall see that the abridgment of legal safeguards is only to be permitted in what are called minor cases. And the cases to be treated under these Acts can by no means be called minor cases, for reasons which I am about to give. First, however, let it be carefully observed that there are two distinct proceedings under the Act, the first being that of which I have treated in the preceding chapter, namely, the determination as to whether the woman be a prostitute or not; and the second, with which I am not dealing here, being that which is directed against the offence created under the Acts, that offence being the carrying on of the trade of a prostitute otherwise than under the conditions imposed by Government. And what we are here particularly objecting to is the making the first proceeding, above referred to, a summary proceeding, and calling that case a minor case which relates to the determination as to whether a woman is immoral or not.