The case in point was a Bill to prevent smuggling, which enacted that upon information being given upon oath before any one justice of the peace, that any persons, to the number of three or more, were assembled to assist in smuggling, the justice might commit them without bail. The great similarity, even of the very wording of this to the Acts which we oppose, will be evident to the reader; but I must point out that this bill against smugglers was infinitely less grievous than these Acts, inasmuch as the action of the justice of the peace here extended only to unbailable imprisonment before trial, which was followed in time by the regular course of jury trial. Lord Hardwicke, whose speech I quote, was a Crown lawyer in the reign of George II., and while calling attention to every part of his speech, I would particularly mark the concluding paragraph, where every word, with the mere alteration of a name, is directly applicable to the question we are now discussing. _Cobbett’s Parliamentary History; debate in the Lords on the Bill to Prevent Smuggling, May 15, 1736._—“The said bill was read for the first and second time in the House of Lords, without any considerable debate, but when it came before the committee several amendments were offered by Lord Hardwicke.” Lord Hardwicke spoke as follows:—“I am very sensible how much it concerns us to prevent that fraudulent and pernicious practice called smuggling, and therefore I shall always be ready to join in such measures as I think proper and necessary for that purpose; but at the same time, my Lords, do not let us forget the freedom of our constitution, and the liberties and privileges of the people; for slavery would be a price too dear even for the most absolute security against smuggling.[48] For this reason, when any method is proposed, or bill brought in for the detecting, apprehending, and punishing persons guilty of such practices, we ought to consider, not only whether it will be effectual for the benefit proposed, but whether it will be consistent with our constitution and the liberties of the people. By all those who understand anything of our constitution, it must be granted that one of the greatest barriers for the liberties of the people is that fundamental maxim of the laws of this kingdom by which every man is presumed innocent till the contrary appears by some overt act of his own, and that act must be such an one as is itself unlawful, and of such a nature that no innocent construction can be put upon it. We have in our laws no such thing as a crime by implication, nor do we pretend to judge of or to punish a man for mere thinking. From hence it is that a wicked or malicious intention can never with us be proved by witnesses.[49] Facts only are admitted to be proved, and the judge and jury are from these facts to determine with what intention they were committed. But no judge or jury can ever by our laws suppose, much less