overt act from whence that intention can possibly be inferred, which is inconsistent with the freedom of our constitution and with the whole tenor of the laws of this kingdom. We may as well admit witnesses to prove that a man got up in the morning and put on his clothes in order to assist in the running of goods, which I am sure would be ridiculous as well as pernicious; but this is not all the hardship of the case: witnesses are not only to be admitted to prove a wicked intention without an overt act, but they are rewarded for giving such testimony,[53] which is a most dangerous practice, and a practice we have lately got too much into; for, in my opinion, no man ought to be admitted as a witness against any criminal if he be to have any share of the payment on his conviction;[54] however, in no case is it so dangerous as it will be in this, because when false witnesses come to swear a _fact_ upon a man which he is innocent of, he may prove himself to have been at another place at the time, or he may fall upon many other ways to make his innocence appear, and to convict the witnesses of perjury, and this is in all other cases a great guard to the innocent; but in the present case I should be glad to know how it will be possible for a man to prove that he had no such _intention_ as is sworn against him, or to convict a false witness of perjury.[55] “With respect, my Lords, to the security of the subject against unjust imprisonment, and with respect to the liberty of applying to the King’s Courts, these valuable privileges are all to be taken away by this new regulation; a man is to be imprisoned without so much as a pretence of his having been guilty of any crime,[56] only because a sorry fellow perhaps has gone and sworn before a country justice, out of malice, that he intended to assist in the running of goods; and though by our constitution every man has a right to insist that in such cases no extravagant bail shall be exacted from him, yet now he is to be committed without bail, there to remain till he can force the justice, and his informer, to bring him to a trial, which I do not see how he can do, for by this clause the Habeas Corpus Act seems to be repealed. Again, if the justice should commit iniquity, either in not admitting of a proper and full vindication, or in delaying to bring the person accused to trial, where shall such person apply for relief? For the power of relief is by this clause taken from the King’s Courts, and is given to the justices of the peace, who are removable at the pleasure of a minister, and may, most of them, be made the drudging tools of an administration. _Therefore I must think it very extraordinary, and inconsistent with the principles of the Revolution, to give such powers to such judges, or to give them any supreme and uncontrollable power whatsoever, especially in cases where the liberty of a subject is in immediate danger._