“Upon the whole, my Lords, I must think this bill one of the most severe and dangerous bills that was ever passed by a British legislature, and yet notwithstanding its severity I am afraid it will be very far from answering the end in view. I am afraid that instead of preventing smuggling it will render hardy and desperate all those who shall hereafter embark in that pernicious trade, which will make them more bold and enterprising than they ever were heretofore, and their common danger will unite them closer together, which will make them more powerful and formidable.... By such laws we may ruin our constitution, we may subject ourselves to arbitrary power, but even arbitrary power itself will not prevent smuggling; for in France, where arbitrary power has long been established, where the punishment of every sort of smuggling is death or the galleys, where they keep up a particular sort of army called _les maltôtiers_ for that very purpose, yet smuggling is in that kingdom as frequent as in England, and their smugglers are much more desperate than ours, for they march in little armies, are well armed and disciplined, and often engage in battle with the custom-house officers and the maltôtiers. The gentlemen of the French army are indeed but seldom employed in such exploits; they think it beneath them to engage against banditti or to hunt after criminals; this low sort of work they look on as fit only for maltôtiers or sheriffs’-officers, and though they have a vast number of such in France, yet with them and with all the other advantages they have, it has never yet been in their power to prevent smuggling.”[59] To this speech of Lord Hardwicke a reply was made abounding in arguments, which bear a remarkable similarity to those used now against us by our opponents, of which I will merely give the following specimens:—“I shall readily agree, my Lord,” says the supporter of the Smuggling Act, in reply to Lord Hardwicke, “that we ought to be extremely cautious in granting any new powers which may any way encroach on the constitution or upon the liberties of the people; but if we make a phantom of every new power and new penalty that may be necessary, and give a loose to our imaginations by supposing that every such power or penalty will be made a wrong and unjust use of, and turned towards the oppression and ruin of the subject, instead of being applied to their relief and preservation, we shall never grant any new power; for no power was ever granted, nor can be granted, upon which a fruitful imagination may not form various scenes of horror and destruction;[60] nay, no power can be granted but what may truly be made a wrong use of, but while we have a Parliament subsisting, while we are subjected to no earthly power but what depends upon Parliament, we have no occasion to frighten ourselves with such chimeras.”