made of power;[64] and if this should ever unfortunately happen to be our case, our Parliaments will neither be willing nor able to check the abuse of any power, or to punish the offenders. For this reason, we ought to be extremely jealous of loading our people with pains and penalties, and subjecting them to a multitude of penal laws; for oppression may be easily cloaked under an Act of Parliament, and many may be punished, under pretence of their having been guilty of some action made penal by Statute without raising any general murmur among the people, or giving alarm to those who think _themselves_ in no danger from any such prosecution. Whereas the least act of oppression without the pretence of Parliament would raise a general murmur and an universal alarm, because every man in the kingdom would then think himself in danger. In this nation no man of common sense would extend his power of oppression to any great length till he had got a Parliament to his mind; but when he has got such a Parliament, his power will then be without control, and by subjecting multitudes of our people to high pains and penalties, and the danger of being prosecuted upon penal Statute, we may render it easy for a man to accomplish this end, which, when once accomplished, may be by the same methods easily preserved as long as he pleases. “No law can be proposed, my Lords, for the necessity of which some reasons may not be urged; even the most tyrannical laws have been made under the pretence of preventing some real abuse.[65] But all wise nations have chosen to allow an abuse to escape unpunished rather than to make such a law as might possibly involve the innocent in the same punishment with the guilty. “If ever any such custom or law should come to be established in this kingdom, the happiness and security of our people would be at an end; we might expect sometime or other to have informers as numerous and frequent in our streets, and in all public places, as ever the ‘delatores’ or informers were about Rome under their most tyrannical emperors. “I shall grant that if the justice of peace understands the spirit of our laws, and acts justly, he will examine the informer narrowly as to circumstances, and will not commit unless the informer gives good reasons against those he informs against. But the words of this clause make no such precautions necessary. We are not now to inquire what the justice _ought_ to do, but what he _may_ do, and I _will_ say that by these words, an information on oath will be a sufficient authority for the commitment, and will excuse the justice from all the penalties of false imprisonment. “May we not suppose that such informations may be cooked up, and persons of great credit committed?... Can we say that any subject is safe who _may_ upon malicious information which he cannot disprove be brought into such danger? I say, my Lords, on information which he cannot disprove, for this will always be the case.”